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Abstract 
Service e-Commerce (SeC) is emerging as a booming form of e-commerce where various services are 
contracted, managed, sold, and even delivered via the Internet. However, the uncertainty of service 
quality due to information asymmetry has been a major challenge to the development of SeC. Some 
SeC platforms tried to promote service business by lowering buyer’s perceived risk through the 
service guarantee mechanism. However, the mechanism seems not very successful to lift the low 
participation rate. This study investigated the effects of service guarantee on service e-marketplace by 
examining the case of zhubajie.com, a well-known service e-marketplace in China. A total of 30,406 
providers (including 406 service-guarantee and 30,000 non-service-guarantee providers) were 
collected and analyzed. The analyses found that there are different modes for low-reputation and 
high-reputation service providers to participate in the service guarantee. In addition, results also 
show that service guarantee only improves business performance for the service providers with high 
reputation. For low-reputation service providers, the service guarantee mechanism does not have 
significant effects. Implications and suggestions were made to guide future practice and research in 
similar contexts.  
Keywords: Service e-Commerce, Service sold online, Service guarantee, Business performance. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
With the development of information technology, various products and services can be displayed, 
advertised, and sold online beyond the limit of space and time (Lee & Park 2009). Specifically, service 
e-commerce (SeC) is becoming an emerging e-business trend in recent years, with a much faster 
growth rate than e-commerce with physical products (Lee & Park 2009). There are two categories of 
SeC, from the perspective of either seller or buyer, service sold online (SSO), and service-oriented 
crowdsourcing (SOC) (Schal 2012). In traditional e-commerce, physical products’ specifications and 
pricing were usually standardized or determined by sellers. Similar to traditional e-commerce, service 
providers in the SSO marketplace determine standardized service items, contents, pricing, and scopes. 
Then buyers can search available services and purchase suitable service online. Compared with SSO, 
the buyers of SOC post the service requirements first, then the service providers submit proposals or 
solutions to earn the contract or win the service award. Basically, SeC has the following characteristics 
(Lee and Park 2009): first, the transaction is conducted via e-commerce; Second, it comprises some 
degree of intangibility; third, the service must involve service and money exchange.  
Because of the inherent intangibility, simultaneity, intimacy and perishability of tangible goods, a SeC 
is comparatively hard to be standardized and delivered (Metters et al. 2004). Although SeC 
transactions are limited by their own characteristics, many providers nevertheless try to offer services 
through Internet channels (Lee and Park 2009). SeC is different from e-service. E-service  is defined 
as an interactive, content-centered, and Internet-based customer service, driven by the customer and 
integrated with related organizational customer support processes and technologies with the goal of 
strengthening the customer-service provider relationship (e.g., news portals, internet broadcasting, 
entertainment, and online books) (Ruyter et al. 2001).  
SeC can be transacted on firm-hosted websites which are developed for some specific services, such as 
online learning (Lee 2010) and online securities brokerage services (Yang & Fang 2004). In addition 
to special service provider websites, SeC transactions can also be conducted on a third-party, two-
sided platform, i.e., service e-marketplace. There are two classes of players in a third-party service e-
marketplace, i.e., the service provider and the service buyer, either of which may be individuals or 
organizations. For example, zhubajie.com is a leading online service intermediary company in China. 
Until October 2012, it has attracted more than 7 million service providers
1
 with over 96,000 posted 
service transactions (exceeded 1.4 billion RMB dollar value
2
). 
Information asymmetry between service providers and service buyers is critical to the development of 
third-party service transaction platforms in which the online service provision takes place between 
parties who have never transacted before (Jøsang et al. 2007). In this condition, it is harder for service 
buyers to distinguish a “good” service provider from “bad” provider, because the buyer has 
insufficient information about the service provider, and about the service itself (Jøsang et al. 2007). 
Information asymmetry about the service provider’s capabilities, fear of opportunism and 
misrepresentation on the part of the service provider can significantly affect the buyer’s perceived risk, 
which has a negative effect on the buyer’s purchase decision (Pavlou et al. 2007). 
In order to lower buyers’ perceived risks, service guarantee was developed as a solution in some third-
party, online service marketplaces, including zhubajie.com. Unlike the service-guarantee mechanism 
in hospitality-related services (e.g., hotels, restaurants, tour services) (Hogreve and Gremler 2009), the 
service guarantee for online service marketplace has the following unique designs. First, the 
mechanism of service guarantee was designed and implemented by the intermediate (third-party) 
                                              
1 The service providers in zhubajie.com are called Witkey which means the key to wit, indicating that they are capable to 
solve the business problems for the service buyers.  
2 The exchange rate between USD and RMB is about 6.2, i.e., one USD equals to about 6.2 RMB dollar.  
company, i.e., the service e-marketplace. Second, the mechanism includes two components: (a) 
Guarantees include various options at multiple levels - the service level and the compensation level 
(Kashyap 2001), (b) individual service providers can select from these options and deposit money to 
the third party company (service transaction platform) during the guarantee period. Third, if 
transaction failure is identified as caused by the service provider, the service e-marketplace will 
compensate the buyer with the money deposited by the service provider.  
Purpose of the study 
This study aims to examine the effects of the service guarantee for SeC because of the following 
reasons: First, extensive studies in service guarantee have been conducted in the fields of hospitality 
(e.g., hotels, restaurants, tour services) and retail (Hogreve and Gremler 2009). Sparse studies were 
focused on guarantees for SeC on the third-party platform. Second, from practical standpoint, 
Zhubajie.com started to carry out the trust assurance system in 2011, and after one year, only 460 
service providers joined the service guarantee mechanism and deposited money. It cannot be viewed 
as a successful practice, while considering more than 7 million service providers in zhubajie.com. 
Based on the above discussions regarding service guarantee’s values and limitations, this paper 
conducted an empirical study in service guarantee for service e-marketplace. In particular, aiming to 
answer the following research questions:  
 What kind(s) of service providers tend to join the service guarantee?  
 What impacts or effects of service guarantee toward service providers’ business performance 
can be observed in this study?  
2 LITERATURE REVIEW: THE VALUE OF GUARANTEE IN 
SERVICE E-COMMERCE 
Service guarantee was borrowed from the product warranty (e.g., Erevelles 1993; Hogreve and 
Gremler 2009), and it has been extensively applied in hospitality related services (e.g., hotels, 
restaurants, tour services) and retail (Hogreve and Gremler 2009). A service guarantee consists of two 
elements: a service promise and a compensation offer in case of service failure (Kashyap 2001).  
Service guarantee design and the outcome of service guarantee are the two main research streams in 
this field (Hogreve and Gremler 2009). In this study, we focus on the customer related impacts of 
service guarantee such as perceived risk and purchase intention. Extant research confirmed that service 
guarantee positively affects consumer’s perceived risk, perception of service quality (Wirtz et al. 
2000; Wu et al. 2012), Pre-purchase evaluations of a service firm (Ostrom and Iacobucci 1998),  and 
purchase intention (Wirtz et al. 2000; Marmorstein et al. 2001). Based on studies in principle-agent, 
perceived risk , and service guarantee (e.g., Kim et al. 2008; Pavlou et al. 2007; Hogreve and Gremler 
2009), a framework was developed as Figure 1 to demonstrate the value of guarantees in SeC.  
 
Figure 1.  The value of service guarantee in service e-marketplaces 
Guarantees in service e-marketplace Purchase intention 
Reputation feedback 
Credibility of service e-marketplace 
Service complexity 
Perceived risk 
2.1.   Perceived Risk and Purchase Intention of SeC  
The SeC transaction process consists of pre-contractual steps (purchase decision) and post-contractual 
processes (service process and perceived service quality). SeC purchase decision process was 
developed following a trust-based decision-making model, in which perceived risk is one key 
antecedent of purchase intention and purchase intention positively affects buyer’s purchase decisions 
(Kim et al. 2008).  
Perceived risk has been formally defined as “a combination of uncertainty plus seriousness of outcome 
involved’’ (Bauer 1967). In this paper, we define a buyer’s perceived risk as his/her belief about the 
potential uncertain negative outcomes from a SeC transaction (Kim et al. 2008). From the 
consequence perspective, perceived risk can be classified as performance risk, time-loss risk, financial 
risk, psychological risk, personal risk, privacy risk, and source risk (Cases 2002; Lim 2003). 
Uncertainty is one important factor of perceived risk based on the definition in Bauer (1967). Pavlou 
et al. (2007) define perceived uncertainty as “the degree by which the outcome of a transaction cannot 
be accurately predicted, the future states of the transaction could vary from a successful product 
fulfillment.” There are two kinds of perceived uncertainty: seller quality uncertainty and product 
quality uncertainty. Seller quality uncertainty is the result of a seller hiding a product’s true 
characteristics, making false promises, shirking, or defrauding. Product quality uncertainty results 
from a product’s condition not being as promised, or a product’s quality being compromised (Pavlou 
et al. 2007). 
2.2.   Effects of Service guarantee and the Moderating Factors 
The effects of service guarantee on perceived risk have been extensively verified in the field of 
traditional hospitality research (Ostrom and Iacobucci 1998; Wirtz et al. 2000; Wu et al. 2012). 
Service guarantee in service e-marketplace has the following unique characteristics: First, in addition 
to service guarantee, reputation feedback system is adopted to further reduce buyer’s perceived risk. 
Second, service guarantee is usually conducted by a third-party company. Third, various types of 
services are transacted on the service e-marketplace, so characteristics of service (e.g., service 
complexity) play important roles in service guarantee.  
From principle agent theory perspective, there are two problems in SeC transactions: the pre-
contractual problem of adverse selection (hidden information) (Akerlof 1970), and the post-contractual 
problem of moral hazard (hidden action) (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976; Pavlou et al. 2007). Hidden 
information refers to the fact that the true qualities of a service provider cannot be completely revealed 
to the service buyer. For simplicity, service provider can be classified as two types, low quality and 
high quality (Pavlou et al. 2007). High quality indicates that the service provider’s trustworthiness is 
high, and the buyer’s perceived risk is low. The first step for a service buyer to get satisfactory service 
is to identify service providers of high quality.  
Examining signals from agents is one important method for service buyers to screen providers (Pavlou 
et al. 2007). Service guarantee in SeC can function as a signal of service provider quality, which will 
build the buyer’s trust and reduce perceived risk. To differentiate high quality agents from low, 
effective signals must be visible, unambiguous, and differentially costly among agents (Rao and 
Ruekert 1994). The service quality from high-ability service providers (i.e., high reputation feedback) 
must be higher than that from low-ability providers. Thus high-ability providers should have lower 
compensation chances than low-ability providers from service failures.  
Reputation feedback information itself is another signal of service buyer quality (Jøsang et al. 2007). 
Jøsang et al. (2007) found that information asymmetry can be mitigated through trust and reputation. 
To deal with information asymmetry issues, third-party service transaction platforms, such as 
zhubajie.com, have developed reputation feedback systems. These systems calculate providers’ 
favorability ratings based on previous buyers’ assessments of their buying experiences and the quality 
of the services provided. In addition, these systems further divide service quality into several 
dimensions, such as service attitude, service efficiency and solution quality. From a theoretical 
perspective, reputation feedback systems can increase a buyer’s trust for the service provider, and 
reduce the buyer’s perceived risks.  
To some extent, the information in the reputation feedback system can provide signals that reduce 
information asymmetry and, consequently, buyers’ apprehension, thus mitigating their perceived 
uncertainty/risk (Pavlou et al. 2007). Compared with service guarantee, reputation feedback 
information is stable data which cannot be set by the service provider. On the contrary, the money 
deposit for service guarantee is the signal sent by the provider, which is one decision variable. 
Jarvenpaa et al. (2000) found that buyer’s perceived reputation positively affect the trust of Internet 
stores. As a result, a service buyer evaluates the service provider’s quality with both reputation 
feedback data and service guarantee. So, provider’s reputation moderates the relationship between 
service guarantee and the perceived risk.  
In addition to reputation feedback, we also identify two moderating factors, i.e., credibility of  and 
service complexity. The credibility of service e-marketplace positively increases the credibility of its 
policies, such as the service guarantee. So we propose that credibility of service e-marketplace 
moderates the effects of service guarantee on perceived risk. Suwelack et al. (2011) found that types of 
product (search and experience goods) moderate the influence of money back guarantees (MBGs). As 
for the service conducted in the e-marketplace, more complex service impose the buyer’s to more risk. 
the impact of guarantees on consumers evaluation might be stronger when the risk level increases 
(Ostrom and Iacobucci 1998).  
3 RESEARCH METHOD 
3.1.   SeC and Service Guarantee in zhubajie.com 
3.1.1.  SeC in zhubajie.com  
Zhubajie.com, founded in 2006, is the largest third-party SeC platform in China with more than 7 
million members. Currently, Zhubajie provides four types of service transactions
3
, contest, bidding, 
fast matching, and hiring. Contest, bidding, and fast matching are types of Service-Oriented 
Crowdsourcing (SOC) transaction. Hiring is a type of Service Sold Online (SSO).  
The initial service transaction mechanism of zhubajie.com is Contest. To conduct a contest, the service 
buyer firstly develops a problem statement and broadcasts the problem on zhubajie.com. Then, service 
providers who register with zhubajie.com analyze the problem and submit solutions. At the end of a 
crowdsourcing contest, the service buyer evaluates the solutions and provides awards to the winner(s) 
(Howe 2006; Howe 2008; Terwiesch and Ulrich 2009). 
Contests are more suitable to solving high creativity problems and high uncertainty problems 
(Boudreau et al. 2011). To increase the number of services sold online, zhubajie.com applied Bidding 
as another transaction mechanism. The service providers do not need to submit final solutions. Instead, 
they provide preliminary plans and set the price for completion. The service buyer receives multiple 
bids and selects the optimal service provider based on evaluation of the qualifications of the service 
provider and the price. 
Biding has its own limitations, for example it requires buyers to spend a great deal of time evaluating 
                                              
3 The latest version of zhubajie.com started from February, 2013 combined contest, bidding, and fast matching as Service-
Oriented Crowdsourcing (SOC). 
service providers’ proposals and qualifications. To quickly match service providers and buyers, 
zhubajie.com developed a new mechanism, called Fast Matching, which can be viewed as a revised 
version of bidding. Using Fast Matching, service buyers only receive one bid (proposal and price) at a 
time. That is to say, service providers negotiate with the buyer sequentially in the order of they bid. 
The fast matching task is closed when the task is contracted between the buyer and winning service 
provider.  
The above three business models are of requirement-pulled, i.e., the service buyer moves first to 
publish the business problems. In 2012, zhubajie.com implemented a service provider-pushed 
mechanism called Hiring which is a type of SSO. In this kind of service transaction, the providers 
describe, and set a price for their service goods, and list them in their profile shops. Service buyers 
search the target provider/service goods, and employ the provider to complete service transactions. 
3.1.2.  Service guarantee in zhubajie.com  
Service in zhubajie.com aims at reducing buyer’s perceived risk with the incentive mechanism, which 
enables more monetary obligation between online traders. The first version of service guarantee in 
zhubajie.com consisted of three options. The first option is originality assurance, which stipulates that 
the solutions were not originally created by another service provider (e.g., copy or infringement of 
others’ work). The second option is completion assurance which aims to ensure that the service is 
completed on schedule. The last option is free revision assurance, indicating that the service provider 
may revise solutions freely after the sale. The service provider may deposit money to buy the 
combination of these three assurances. The originality option is 2000 RMB dollars, the completion 
assurance is 1000 RMB dollars, and the free revision assurance is 500 RMB dollars. If the service 
provider violates the above warranties, the buyer will be compensated with the money deposited by 
the provider. 
The latest version of service guarantee, deployed in August 2012 in zhubajie.com, has four options 
(http://chengxin.zhubajie.com/security/witkey). A comparison of the first and second generation of 
service guarantee is listed in Table 1. The data used in this paper is from the first version guarantees. 
The first option of the second version service guarantee is trust assurance, which aims to ensure that 
the service goods descriptions are not overstated, and that the service is completed on time. The 
difference between this option and completion assurance is that trust assurance is more suitable to 
provider-pushed service transactions, in that it requires that service goods descriptions must not be 
exaggerated. The second option is originality assurance which is identical to the corresponding option 
in the first service guarantee. In the new service guarantee, after sale service is divided into two parts, 
i.e., the third option, free revision assurance, and the fourth, free maintenance for three months. The 
free revision assurance applies to creative tasks, such as logo design, website design, etc. Free 
maintenance for three months is suitable for website development, software development, and mobile 
application development.  
 
Service guarantee  1
st
 generation 2
nd
 generation Brief description 
completion √  Complete service on schedule 
originality √ √ The solutions are originally created 
free revision √ √ Revise the solutions free of charge 
trust assurance  √ Service goods description is not overstated, and 
the completion of service is on time 
free maintenance for 
three month 
 √ Maintain the solutions (e.g., software) without 
charge for three months 
Table 1.  Comparisons of the two generations of service guarantee in zhubajie.com 
3.2.   Data collection 
406 service providers joined the first version of Zhubajie’s service guarantee system were collected for 
this study. The other 30,000 service providers were randomly collected from providers who did not 
participate in the service guarantee system for comparison purposes. In addition to the basic profiling 
information of the service providers, we also collected their service transaction records from 
zhubajie.com. Based on the transactions records and the profiling information of service providers, we 
got the variables for data analysis listed in Table 2. The descriptive statistics of these 406 service 
providers who join service guarantee are shown in Table 3.  
 
Variable Description 
Ability_rank Ability rank is computed with ability value. The range of rank is from 
integer zero to eight.  For example, if the ability value is zero, then the 
rank is zero. If the ability value is between 300,000 and 600,000, then the 
rank is eight. 
Ability_value Ability value is the accumulation of the reward of the successful 
transactions which received good evaluations or medium evaluations 
from the service buyers. If a service gains good evaluation, its reward is 
added to ability value. If a service gains medium evaluation, half of its 
reward is added to ability value.  
Bid_success_money The accumulation of the reward of successful service transactions with 
bidding. 
Bid_success_num The times of successful service transactions with bidding. 
Bidding_success_ratio The variable is used to test the effect of service guarantee on provider’s 
bidding performance. Bidding success ratio is calculated by dividing the 
successful bidding by the total bidding times. 
Certificate_num The service providers in zhubajie.com can post some certificates to signal 
their professional competency. This variable refers the certificates 
number. 
Confirmed_num The service e-marketplace operator can confirm service providers 
information in diverse ways, such as email, mobile phone, and ID card. 
This variable is the number of confirmations which pass zhubajie.com 
examination. 
Contest_success_ratio  The variable is used to test the effect of service guarantee on provider’s 
contest performance. Contest success ratio is calculated by dividing the 
successful contest times by the total contest participation times. 
Contest_success_money The accumulation of the reward of successful service contests. 
Deposit money To join service guarantee system in zhubajie.com, the service providers 
are required to deposit some money to deal with the service failure.  
Hiring frequency The variable is used to test the effect of service guarantee on provider’s 
hiring performance. Hiring frequency refers how many times the service 
provider employed by buyers to conduct service. 
Gain_money This variable is the accumulation of the reward of the successful service 
transactions.  
Gain_money_per_month This variable is the derived by dividing gain_money by the membership 
duration in month unit.  
Good_evaluation_money This variable is the accumulation of the reward of the successful service 
transactions which received good evaluations. 
Good_evaluation_ratio In addition to evaluate service speed, service attitude, and service quality, 
service buyers can evaluate the service overall. The overall evaluations 
also include good, medium, and bad evaluation. The good evaluation 
ratio is calculated by dividing good evaluations times by the total 
evaluations.  
Matching_success_ratio The variable is used to test the effect of service guarantee on provider’s 
matching performance. Matching success ratio is computed by dividing 
Variable Description 
the successful matching times by the participation times.  
Member_duration This variable refers how long the service provider have registed in 
zhubajie.com measured in month unit.  
Money_per_task It refers the average reward size of the service transactions.  
Notended_task_num Although the service providers and the buyers come into initial 
transaction intention, they often failed to approached to the final 
transaction contract.  
Service_average_attitude Service attitude is scored by service buyers to evaluate the service 
providers. Attitue evaluations include good, medium, and bad which are 
received from service buyers after the completion of service transaction. 
Zhbuajie.com codes good evaluation is code as 2, medium evaluation as 
1, and bad evaluation as 0. Average attitude is computed by dividing the 
sum of attitude by the evaluations times. 
Service_average_attitude_best_ratio This variable is computed by dividing the good evaluations times of 
service attitude by the total attitude evaluation times. 
Service_average_quality Quality evaluations include good, medium, and bad which are received 
from service buyers after the completion of service transaction. 
Zhbuajie.com codes good evaluation is code as 2, medium evaluation as 
1, and bad evaluation as 0. Average quality is computed by dividing the 
sum of quality by the evaluations times. 
Service_average_speed Service speed refers how soon the service is completed. Similar to 
service quality, service Speed evaluations include good, medium, and bad 
which are received from service buyers after the completion of service 
transaction.  
Service_average_speed_best_ratio This variable is computed by dividing the good evaluations times of 
service speed by the total evaluation times. 
Service_sold_num Each service provider can sold many service in zhubajie.com.  
Skill_num Each service provider can show multiple skills labels online.  
Success_task_num This variables refers the total number of the service transactions which 
come into the final contract or not come into the final contract.  
Table 2.  Variables list collected from Zhubajie.com for data analysis 
 
Variables Mean SD Min Max 
Membership 
duration (month) 
15.07 14.96 0 66 
Gain money (￥) 21,600.00 54,666.80 1.0 526689.6 
Successful 
transaction number 
32.07 105.809 0 1081 
Good evaluation 
ratio 
0.99 0.06 0 1 
Deposit money   1,865.23 1,102.57 1000 6500 
Ability rank  2.20 2.03 0 8 
 Frequency Percentage(%)   
Individual or firm   0 1 
Individual  327 80.50   
Firm 78 19.20   
Missing  1 0.20   
Table 3.  Descriptive statistics of the 406 service providers 
3.3.   Results  
3.3.1. Service Provider Profiling 
Clustering analysis was conducted to depict profiles of 406 providers who enrolled in service 
guarantee. Two clusters were generated by clustering analysis in Table 4. Based on the results, cluster 
1 represents low-reputation service providers with less successful completed transactions, and shorter 
membership durations. On average, providers in Cluster 1 have been as a member in Zhubajie.com for 
7.09 months. However, these providers almost haven’t made any money from the platform. On the 
other hand, Cluster 2 represents high-reputation service providers who have been highly successful in 
Zhubarjie.com. These providers have aggregated significantly higher transaction records and 
averagely have been Zhubajie’s members for 19.94 months. The same clustering algorithm was 
applied to classify 30,000 providers into two Clusters, Cluster 3 and Cluster 4, which represent low-
reputation non-service-guarantee and high-reputation non-service-guarantee providers respectively. 
 
Variable Cluster1 Cluster2 Total 
Number of Provides 154 252 406 
Average of money_per_task 2.60 647.03 402.59 
Average of gain_money 2.60 21,766.94 13,511.50 
Average of ability_value 2.60 21,720.63 13,482.76 
Average of service_average_quality 0.00 4.89 3.04 
Average of ability_rank 0.02 3.54 2.20 
Average of success_task_num 0.01 51.65 32.07 
Average of member_duration 7.09 19.94 15.07 
Table 4.  Results of Clustering Analysis 
Examining results of clustering analysis allows identifying what types of service providers tended to 
join service guarantee. Table 5 shows profiles of low-reputation service providers who chose to 
participate or not participate in service guarantee. Based on the results, low-reputation providers who 
participated in the service guarantee have shorter membership duration, higher skill level and more 
transactions than low-reputation non-service-guarantee providers. However, the low-reputation 
service-guarantee providers’ have more uncompleted (failed) transactions. Based on above results, 
these skilled, low-reputation providers might utilize service guarantee as a means to attract more 
transactions.  
 
Variable Low-reputation  service-
guarantee providers 
Low-reputation non-
service-guarantee 
providers 
Average of confirmed_num 2.7597 0.1848 
Average of service_sold_num 0.8831 0.0110 
Average of skill_num 3.3636 0.2872 
Average of member_duration 7.0909 23.8078 
Average of service_average_attitude 0.5519 0.0121 
Average of service_average_attitude_best_ratio 0.1104 0.0024 
Average of service_average_speed 0.5519 0.0121 
Average of service_average_speed_best_ratio 0.1104 0.0024 
Average of certificate_num 0.0455 0.0029 
Average of not_ended_task_num 0.1883 0.0409 
Table 5.  Comparisons of low-reputation service providers who participated or not participated 
in service guarantee 
Table 6 compares profiles of high-reputation service providers who participated or not participated in 
service guarantee. The results show high-reputation providers who participated in service guarantee 
have much more successful transaction records than non-service-guarantees providers. The results 
imply these service-guarantee providers have been highly successful in the service e-marketplace. 
They joined service guarantee because they want to maintain their high profiles.  
 
Variable  High-reputation service-
guarantee providers 
High-reputation non-
service-guarantee providers 
Average of servicesold_num 4.738 0.454 
Average of ability_value 21,720.629 1,633.970 
Average of gain_money_per_month 1,125.991 121.737 
Average of contest_success_money 16,346.588 381.712 
Average of ability_rank 3.536 1.774 
Average of gain_money 21,766.943 1,635.470 
Average of goode_valuation_money 21,690.894 1,633.454 
Average of bid_success_num 2.524 0.052 
Average of bid_success_money 3,356.920 40.780 
Average of service_average_quality 4.893 3.778 
Table 6.  Comparisons of high-reputation service providers who participated or not 
participated in service guarantee 
3.3.2. The effects of guarantees on service provider’s business performance  
Previous sections introduced four major types of transactions (hiring, matching, bidding, and contest ) 
on Zhubajie. Table 7 shows how service guarantee influenced low-reputation and high-reputation 
providers on numbers of various transactions. 
Service-Oriented Crowdsourcing (SOC) transactions (contest, bidding, and fast matching) require 
service providers' competitions by offering the best solution, the lowest price, or the most appropriate 
provider. The success ratio (total number of successful projects/ total number of participated projects) 
was used as an performance indicator of these types of transactions. On the other hand, Service Sold 
Online transactions (hiring) allow buyers to select providers directly without going through 
competition. The frequency of hiring was used as a performance indicator for hiring transactions.  
To identify effects of service guarantee, service providers’ performance on above four types of 
transactions were compared between before and after joining service guarantee Paired samples t-tests. 
Table 7 shows the comparison results Based on the results, joining service guarantee cannot improve 
the successful rate of bidding transactions. Except for that, joining service guarantee did increase 
successful rate of Cluster 2 (high-reputation) service providers. However, similar effects cannot be 
found in Cluster 1 (low-reputation) service providers. Service guarantee only significantly increased 
the successful rate of contest transactions for low-reputation providers at marginal level.  
 
Business performance  low-reputation providers high-reputation providers 
Contest success ratio  .073※ .089※ 
Bidding success ratio .237
ns
 0.126
 ns
 
Matching success ratio .347
ns
 .000*** 
Hiring frequency .319
ns
 .013* 
Table 7.  The effects of service guarantee on service providers’ business performance 
Note: significant ※ 0.1 level, * 0.05 level, ** 0.01 level, *** 0.001 level, ns not significant.  
4 DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
This study empirically studied the application of guarantee in SeC which is one booming e-business 
area. This study makes three theoretical contributions. Firstly, based on literature review, a framework 
was developed to illustrate the effects of service guarantee in SeC marketplace. Although extensive 
studies have investigated the influence of service guarantee on buyer’s perceived risk (e.g., Wirtz et al. 
2000; Wu et al. 2012), these studies did not consider unique characteristics of SeC e-marketplace 
including moderating factors like reputation feedback, credibility of service, task complexity.  
Second, with the data collected from zhubajie.com, this study identified what kind of service providers 
tended to join service guarantee. Results show that both of high-reputation and low-reputation service 
providers might participate in the service guarantee system. However, their profiles are different. The 
low-reputation service providers had shorter membership durations, higher accumulated transaction 
amounts (comparing with providers with similar reputation levels), and higher failure rate. These 
providers regarded service guarantee as a means to improve their success ratio by increasing their 
perceived credibility. On the other hand, high reputation providers have accumulated high reputations 
to reduce the buyers’ perceived risk (Pavlou et al. 2007; Pavlou and Gefen 2004), these providers 
participated in service guarantee to block low-reputation competitors’ chances.  
Third, Effects of service guarantee on the service provider’s performance was also examined. Previous 
research in service guarantee paid more  attentions to the influence of service guarantee from service 
provider’s perspectives, such as the employee motivation, service quality improvement, and service 
innovation (Hogreve and Gremler 2009). In this study, we focused on service provider’s performance. 
The results indicated different effects of service guarantee for low-reputation providers and high-
reputation providers. Although low-service providers aim to improve their success by joining service 
guarantee, the action didn’t have significant positive effects. On the other hand, , service guarantee  
increased high reputation providers’ transactions in types of matching, performance, and hiring. This 
finding is consistent with Wu et al. (2012) which found that corporate reputation has a moderating 
effect on the relationship between service guarantee type, perceived quality, and perceived risk, which 
result in the different effects of service guarantee for low-reputation providers and high-reputation 
service providers.  
The results show service guarantee is not an effective approach for low-reputation providers because 
the mechanism doesn’t mitigate uncertainty and information asymmetry. Therefore, SeC needs more 
mechanisms (such as social community and strict qualification/certificate check) traditional e-
commerce because of its unique characteristics.  
Acknowledgements 
We gratefully acknowledge the Chinese Ministry of Education Humanities and Social Sciences Young 
Scholar Fund (12YJCZH306), and China National Social Sciences Fund (11AZD077), and 
Southwestern University of Finance and Economics “211 projects” Fund (211QN2011047), and 
Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (JBK120505). We also thank program charis 
Jae-Nam Lee, Ji-Ye Mao, James Thong, and two anonymous referees for suggestions to improve the 
paper.  
References 
Akerlof, G. (1970). The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), 488-500. 
Bauer, R. (1967). Consumer behavior as risk taking. In: Cox, D. (Ed.), Risk Taking and Information 
Handling in Consumer Behavior. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Boudreau, K. J., N. Lacetera, et al. (2011 ). Incentives and Problem Uncertainty in Innovation 
Contests: An Empirical Analysis. Management Science, 57(5), 843-863. 
Cases, A.-S. (2002). Perceived  risk  and  risk reduction  strategies  in Internet  shopping. The 
International Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research, 12(4), 375–394. 
Erevelles, S. (1993). The price-warranty contract and product attitudes. Journal of Business Research, 
27(2), 171-81. 
Hogreve, J. and D. D. Gremler (2009 ). Twenty Years of Service Guarantee Research: A Synthesis. 
Journal of Service Research, 11(4), 322-343. 
Howe, J. (2006). Crowdsourcing: A Definition. 
http://crowdsourcing.typepad.com/cs/2006/06/crowdsourcing_a.html. 
Howe, J. (2008). Crowdsourcing: Why the Power of the Crowd Is Driving the Future of Business. 
Crown Business, New York. 
Jarvenpaa, S. L., N. Tractinsky, et al. (2000). Consumer trust in an Internet store. Information 
Technology and Management, 1(1), 45–71. 
Jøsang, A., R. Ismail, et al. (2007). A survey of trust and reputation systems for online service 
provision. Decision Support Systems 43(2), 618– 644. 
Kashyap, R. (2001). The effects of service guarantees on external and internal markets. Academy of 
Marketing Science Review, 1(10), 45-71. 
Kim, D. J., D. L. Ferrin, et al. (2008). A trust-based consumer decision-making model in electronic 
commerce: The role of trust, perceived risk, and their antecedents. Decision Support Systems, 
44(2), 544–564. 
Lee, J.-W. (2010). Online support service quality, online learning acceptance, and student satisfaction. 
Internet and Higher Education, 13(4), 277-283. 
Lee, S. and Y. Park (2009). The classification and strategic management of services in e-commerce: 
Development of service taxonomy based on customer perception. Expert Systems with 
Applications, 36(6), 9618-9624. 
Lim, N. (2003). Consumers’ perceived risk: sources versus consequences. Electronic Commerce 
Research and Applications, 2(3), 216-222. 
Marmorstein, H., D. Sarel, et al. (2001). Increasing the persuasiveness of a service guarantee: the role 
of service process evidence. Journal of Services Marketing, 15(2), 147-159. 
Metters, R., K. King-Metter, et al. (2004). Successful service operations management. Thomson, 
Seoul. 
Ostrom, A. L. and D. Iacobucci (1998). The effect of guarantees on consumers' evaluation of services. 
Journal of Services Marketing, 12(5), 362-378. 
Pavlou, P. A. and D. Gefen (2004). Building Effective Online Marketplaces with Institution-Based 
Trust. Information Systems Research, 15(1), 37-59. 
Pavlou, P. A., H. Liang, et al. (2007). Understanding And Mitigating Uncertainty In Online Exchange 
Relationships: A Principal Agent Perspective. MIS Quarterly 31(1), 105-136. 
Rao, A. R. and R. W. Ruekert (1994). Brand Alliances as Signals of Product Quality. Sloan 
Management Review, 36, 87-97. 
Rothschild, M. and J. E. Stiglitz (1976). Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on 
the Economics of Imperfect Information. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 90(4), 629-649. 
Ruyter, K. d., M. Wetzels, et al. (2001). Customer adoption of e-service: an experimental study. 
International Journal of Service Industry Management, 12(2), 184-207. 
Schal, D. (2012). Service-Oriented Crowdsourcing: Architecture, Protocols and Algorithms. Springer. 
Suwelack, T., J. Hogreve, et al. (2011). Understanding Money-Back Guarantees: Cognitive, Affective, 
and Behavioral Outcomes. Journal of Retailing, 87(4), 462-478. 
Terwiesch, C., Ulrich, K. T., 2009. Innovation tournaments. Harvard Business School Press, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Wirtz, J., D. Kum, et al. (2000). Should a firm with a reputation for outstanding service quality offer a 
service guarantee? Journal of Services Marketing, 14 (6): 502 - 512. 
Wu, C. H.-J., H.-C. Liao, et al. (2012). Service guarantees in the hotel industry: Their effects on 
consumer risk and service quality perceptions. International Journal of Hospitality Management, 
31(3), 757- 763. 
Yang, Z. and X. Fang (2004). Online service quality dimensions and their relationships with 
satisfaction: A content analysis of customer reviews of securities brokerage services. International 
Journal of Service Industry Management, 15(3), 302 - 326. 
